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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The existence of a trade-off between competition and bank risk-taking, and by extension, 
between competition and financial stability, is rooted in a special version of an intuitively 
appealing and powerful argument, the “charter value hypothesis” (CVH).  The CVH states 
that under limited liability and unobservable risk choices, a borrower will choose riskier 
investments when the cost of debt is higher, since she will fully enjoy the upside of its return 
if the investment outcome is favorable, but its losses will be limited in the case of an adverse 
investment outcome. Thus, higher funding costs due to increased competition will erode a 
borrower’s charter value (expected profits), prompting her to take on more risk.  
 
The CVH has been implemented by modeling banks as entities raising funds from insured 
depositors and choosing the risk of their investment portfolio. If deposits become more 
expensive due to increased competition for funding, then there is an incentive for banks to 
take on more risk. This implication has been illustrated by Allen and Gale (2000 and 2004a) 
in both static and  simple dynamic settings, and it is the key thrust of work by Keeley (1990),  
Matutes and Vives (1996), Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), Cordella and Levi-Yeyati 
(2002),  Repullo (2004), and many others. Importantly, the CVH is also a key ingredient of 
many models that rationalize the incentives for banks to take on more risk under deposit 
insurance, as well as a basic tenet underlying key bank regulations, such as capital 
requirements.1  
 
However, when banks compete in both loan and deposit markets, Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) 
showed that the trade-off between competition and financial stability can vanish. In their 
model, firms choose the risk of their investment given the loan rates charged by banks, while 
banks provide loans to firms with insured deposits. Thus, risk is determined jointly by firms 
and banks. An increase in bank competition reduces loan rates charged to firms, but increases 
the cost of funds for banks. As firms’ charter value increases with lower loan rates, they 
choose safer investments, which in turn translates into a safer loan portfolio for banks. The 
charter value of the bank is reduced by the increase in the deposit rates,  but under fairly 
standard assumptions the equilibrium outcome is one in which banks find it optimal to 
choose lower loan rates as competition increases. Thus, in this more complex setting the 
CVH is applied to two entities—firms and banks—and their charter values are interlinked. 
Recent extensions of this type of model—introducing different assets (Boyd, De Nicolò and 
Jalal, 2006 and 2009),  bank heterogeneity (De Nicolò and Loukoianova, 2007), or a different 
risk structure (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2008)—have all essentially aimed at establishing 
under what conditions the trade-off between competition and financial stability predicted by 
the CVH holds.   
 
Yet, as pointed out by Allen and Gale (2004a), the trade-off between competition and 
financial stability identified by a large portion of the literature is based on partial equilibrium 
modeling. In their general equilibrium formulation of a Diamond and Dybvig (1983)-type 
economy, Allen and Gale (2004b) demonstrate that perfect competition among 
                                                 
1 For detailed surveys of these literatures, see Gorton and Winton (2003) and Freixas and Rochet (2008). 
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intermediaries is Pareto optimal under complete markets, and constrained Pareto optimal 
under incomplete markets, with financial ”instability” as a necessary condition of optimality. 
Analogous results are obtained under low inflation in the general equilibrium monetary 
economy with aggregate liquidity risk analyzed by Boyd, De Nicolò and Smith (2004).2  
Although these general equilibrium results utterly contrasts with the conventional wisdom 
based on many partial equilibrium formulations of the CVH, a direct comparison between 
these formulations is not entirely apt, as these general equilibrium models do not feature the 
type of moral hazard in investment associated with financing choices on which the CVH is 
based.   
 
In this paper we assess the general equilibrium implications of the CVH for competition, 
financial stability and welfare in two versions of a simple general equilibrium model in 
which the choice of the risky investment is unobservable by investors: this is precisely the 
type of information asymmetry generating the moral hazard problem highlighted in partial 
equilibrium formulations of the CVH. As argued below, our analysis is not only of 
theoretical interest, since the CVH has had, and still has a great influence in informing 
financial policy.  
 
In our model, agents specialize in production at the start date, choosing to become either 
firm-entrepreneurs, or bank-entrepreneurs, or depositors, and at a later date they make their 
investment and financing decisions. Our goal is to establish a mapping between bank market 
power rents and investment and consumption allocations that is independent of any specific 
mechanism generating such rents. We accomplish this goal in three steps. First, we identify  
equilibriums with intermediation parameterized by a given interest rate on debt contracts. 
Second, we characterize first best and constrained optimality, and define a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium as the equilibrium debt contract interest rate that supports a core 
allocation. Lastly, bank market power rents are defined as the deviation of an equilibrium 
debt contract interest rate from the debt contract interest rate prevailing at a core (perfectly 
competitive) allocation.  
 
We consider two versions of the model. The first version has banks as coalitions of 
entrepreneurs that are financed by depositors. In the second version, the first model is 
extended to include firms financed by banks funded with deposits. In both models, we show 
that lower banks’ market power rents result in lower economy-wide risk, lower capital ratios, 
more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition, in 
the form of the absence of banks’ market power rents, supports a (second) best allocations 
and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization.  Thus, a general equilibrium economy with 
investment choices subject to moral hazard delivers implications identical to those obtained 
by Allen and Gale (2004b) and Boyd, De Nicolò and Smith (2004) in economies lacking 
these features.  
 
                                                 
2 Boyd, Chang and Smith (2002) also show that some of the standard implications of partial equilibrium 
modeling concerning the risk effects of deposit insurance may not necessarily hold in general equilibrium. 
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It is remarkable that in general equilibrium the implications of the CVH for bank risk and 
bank capitalization turn out to be exactly opposite to what a partial equilibrium set-up would 
imply. In a nutshell, this is why. In partial equilibrium, the CVH is based on treating the 
amount of available funding for a bank or a firm as either given, or represented by supply and 
demand functions that are determined independently.  Likewise, agents’ choices of whether 
specializing in production, intermediation or becoming depositors are typically either treated 
as exogenous or assumed to be independent.  Therefore, an increase in the cost of funding 
prompts either banks, or firms financed by banks, to choose riskier investment for any given 
amount of funding they obtain. By contrast, in general equilibrium agents’ specialization 
choices as well as their funding decisions are not independent. Thus, an increase in the cost 
of funding will also increase the amount of funding available for investment. In our set-up, 
such an increase will offset the negative impact of higher funding costs on borrowers’ charter 
values. This explains why the equilibrium outcome of an increase in the cost of funding 
results in borrowers choosing a lower rather than a higher level of risk.  In essence, the 
partial equilibrium interpretation of the CVH remains a good description of incentives, but it 
is not necessarily a good predictor of actual outcomes.   
 
The remainder of the paper is composed of five sections.  Section II describes the basic 
version of the model with banks and depositors only.  Section III proves existence of 
equilibriums under moral hazard and no-moral hazard for given interest rates on debt 
contracts, illustrating the relevant comparative statics. Section IV characterizes optimality, 
defines bank market power rents, and establishes the inverse relationship between bank 
market power rents and optimality. Section V consider the extended model with firms, banks 
and depositors, and demonstrates that all results obtained in the model with banks and 
depositors only continue to hold in the extended model with firms, banks and depositors. 
Section VI concludes, pointing out fruitful research’s avenues and  the empirical relevance of 
our results, and arguing for the importance of general equilibrium modeling for financial 
policy. Proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix. 
 
 
II.   THE BASIC MODEL 
A.   Time, Endowments and Preferences 
There are three dates, 0, 1 and 2, and a continuum of agents on[0,1]  indexed by [0,1]q∈ . A 
type- q  agent has an endowment of qW  units of date 0 good and labor l . Total date 0 goods 
in the economy are therefore
1
0 2
WW qdq =∫ , with 1W > .  
The type of an agent is the agent’s private information. We assume it cannot be observed by 
any other agent, or communicated credibly to any other agent at any feasible resource cost. In 
practice, this assumption of unobservability of types is similar to the unobservability of 
projects’ types in the model by Boyd and Prescott (1986). As in that model, it rules out the 
possibility that contracting among agents at the initial date is made conditional on their 
endowments.  
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All agents have preferences over date 2 consumption only, are risk neutral, and derive 
disutility from work. Accordingly, preferences are represented by ( ) ( )U c V l− , where 
( )U c c=  and 2( )
2
V l lα= .  
 
B.   Technologies   
All agents have a costly access to an “entrepreneurial” technology that requires investment of 
all their date 0 good endowment, and allows them to undertake a risky project at date 1.  If an 
agent chooses to operate a risky project, then he/she becomes an entrepreneur.  Otherwise, 
an agent becomes an investor and her endowment of date 0 good is carried over to date 1.  
 
Agents differ with respect to the resource cost incurred in becoming entrepreneurs. 
Specifically, the “entrepreneurial” technology allows an agent [0,1]q∈  to choose and 
operate a risky technology at date 1 by transforming all his date 0 good endowment into an 
amount (0, )k W∈  of date 1 goods.   Thus, the resource cost for agent q to become an 
entrepreneur is qW , and the opportunity cost of becoming entrepreneurs increases with 
agents’ endowments of date 0 good. Equivalently, agents with a smaller endowment have a 
relatively more “productive” entrepreneurial technology.  
 
We interpret the level of k  as the capital available to a bank-entrepreneur. As we show 
below, aggregate capital will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. This feature of our 
model is novel relative to the set-ups by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Boot and Thakor 
(1997), where the aggregate levels of internal funding by either firms or intermediaries are 
exogenously given. 
 
Becoming an entrepreneur entails access to a set of risky projects with constant returns to 
scale. Projects are indexed by their probability of success [0,1]p∈ . A p-project yields X per 
unit invested with probability p, and 0 otherwise. Choosing p  requires labor, according to 
the linear technology p l= .  Thus, an entrepreneur will incur a disutility 2( )
2
V p pα=  in 
choosing a p-project. 
 
In the basic version of the model, project outcomes are assumed to be perfectly correlated. 
As noted in Allen and Gale (2000), this assumption is equivalent to assuming that the risk of 
each investment can be decomposed into a common and an idiosyncratic component, and that 
the idiosyncratic component can be diversified away with a large number of investments.  
 
As noted, as an alternative to becoming an entrepreneur, an agent can become an investor, 
who lends his/her endowment at date 1 to a set of entrepreneurs, as detailed below. 
 
C.   Contracts and Information 
Once agents have decided whether to become entrepreneurs or investors, they pool resources 
to finance investment at date 1. We call these coalitions of entrepreneurs and investors 
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“banks”. Since the production technology is constant return to scale, the size distribution of 
banks is indeterminate. For this reason, it is noteworthy that any result we obtain below is 
independent of market structure.  
 
We assume that investors, called depositors, finance banks with simple debt contracts. These 
contracts pay a fixed amount Rˆ  per unit invested if the investment outcome is successful, 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
We do not place any specific restrictions on agents’ interactions, assuming just that  banks 
and depositors will bargain over Rˆ  at date 1. As made precise below, a lower Rˆ  will be 
viewed as associated with a stronger bargaining power of banks vis a vis depositors. Thus, a 
lower level of Rˆ  relative to the level of Rˆ  arising from perfect competition will be 
associated with a higher level of rent extraction by banks.  
 
As our focus is on the effects of banks’ market power rents on risk and real allocations, we 
treat Rˆ  as an exogenous parameter indexing the level of bank market power rents. Thus, we 
refrain to model any specific bargaining game generating certain levels of rents. For our 
purposes, the existence of rents suffices, whatever is the mechanism that generates them.  
 
We consider equilibrium outcomes under two information structures. In the moral hazard 
case, we assume that the choice of p is privately observed by banks, so that there is moral 
hazard. Thus, banks and depositors will bargain over a given value of Rˆ R= , independent of 
the (unobservable) choice of risk p . In the no-moral hazard case the choice of p is publicly 
observed by both banks and depositors, so that there is no moral hazard. Therefore, banks 
and depositors will bargain over a given value of ˆ RR
p
= , which does depend on the 
(observable) choice of risk p .  
 
The sequence of events in this economy is summarized as follows. At date 0, agents decide to 
become banks or depositors. At date 1, banks and depositors bargain on R , and once an 
agreement is reached, bankers choose p and investment occurs. At date 2, the output is 
realized, and consumption follows.  
 
 
III.   EQUILIBRIUM WITH BANKS AND DEPOSITORS 
In this section we establish existence of unique equilibriums for given values of Rˆ , and 
characterize the comparative statics of the model with respect to changes in Rˆ  under moral 
hazard and no-moral hazard as well. 
 
A.   Moral Hazard 
Let I denote depositors’ total supply of funds. Given I , at date 1 any coalition of bank-
entrepreneurs of positive measure 0λ >  will choose p to maximize 
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2
[( ) ]
2
pp X R I Xk α λ⎛ ⎞− + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠         (1). 
We focus on interior solutions, denoted with *.  The optimal choice of p satisfies  
 
                                                            * ( )X R I Xkp α
− +=     (2).  
 
In partial equilibrium, problem (1) represents a simple formulation of the incentives induced 
by the CVH. Its solution (2) represents the relevant outcome. Given I , an increase in R  will 
decrease banks’ profits in the good state, prompting them to increase risk by choosing a 
lower p . However, in general equilibrium depositors’ supply of funds I  is not given, but 
determined endogenously. If I  increases with R , and this increase offsets the decline in 
bank profits due to an increase in R , then in equilibrium p will increase. The general 
equilibrium outcome of the CVH may turn out to be exactly of the opposite sign of its partial 
equilibrium counterpart. Indeed, we demonstrate this to be the case next.   
 
The profits per bank-entrepreneur in a coalition are: 
 
  
*2
*( ) [( ) ]
2
pI p X R I Xk αΠ ≡ − + − =
2[( ) ]
2
X R I Xk
α
− +         (3). 
 
Therefore, at date 0 an agent [0,1]q∈  will choose to become a bank-entrepreneur if  
 
*( )I p RqWΠ ≥           (4) 
 
Let qˆ  denote the agent who is indifferent between being a bank-entrepreneur or an investor. 
Then, 
* ˆ( )I p RqWΠ =      (5) 
 
Clearly, all agents with ˆ[0, ]q q∈  will become bank-entrepreneurs, while those with 
ˆ( ,1]q q∈ will become depositors. Therefore, the fractions of bank-entrepreneurs and 
depositors are qˆ  and ˆ1 q−  respectively. 
 
Note that for any bank to attract external funding, (0, ]R X∈ . Of course, no agent would 
become a depositor if 0R = , while no bank would raise any funding from depositors if 
R X> .  
 
Absent intermediation, in this economy all agents would become entrepreneurs and invest 
their funds in risky projects, but this autarkic arrangement would be clearly inefficient. Thus, 
intermediation can be viewed as essential in a weak sense: as intermediation arrangements 
improve on agents’ welfare under autarky, then they will likely be set up. However, other 
decentralized arrangements, such as credit markets, might attain the same allocations, and 
could be adopted as well, exclusively or in combination.  
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We focus on equilibriums with intermediation, defined as follows: 
 
Definition.  An equilibrium with intermediation is a triplet * * *ˆ( , , )I p q  and a value 
* * *ˆ{ (0, ] : 0, (0,1), (0,1)}R R X I p q∈ ∈ ≥ ∈ ∈  such that:   
*
* ( )X R I Xkp α
− +=     (6) 
* * *ˆ( )I p Rq WΠ =   (7) 
 
*
1 *2
*
ˆ
ˆ(1 )
2q
W qI W qdq −= =∫    (8) 
 
Therefore, an equilibrium triplet ( , , )I p q satisfies the following conditions: 
 
( )X R I Xkp α
− +=             (6) 
[( ) ]
2
X R I Xk RqW− + =     (9) 
2(1 )
2
W qI −=                   (10) 
 
The existence of equilibriums with intermediation is proved in the following  
 
Proposition 1.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors an equilibrium with 
intermediation exists and it is unique for every ( , ]
2
XkR X
W
∈ .  
 
Moving to the comparative statics, denote with z
dYY
dz
≡  the change in the endogenous 
variable Y with respect to parameter z . In this economy, the endogenous bank capital ratio is 
given by qkK
I qk
= + .  
 
The comparative statics of the equilibrium triplet * * *ˆ( , , )I p q  and *K with respect to R  , as 
well as that of *p  with respect to k , is summarized in the following. 
 
Proposition 2.    In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors:  
              * 0RI > , *ˆ 0Rq < , * 0Rp > , * 0RK <  and * 0kp > . 
 
 
Proposition 2 illustrates clearly the sense in which the general equilibrium outcome of the 
CVH turns out to be opposite to its partial equilibrium counterpart. As R  increases, bank 
profits decline, ceteris paribus. This will induce a larger fraction of agents to become 
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depositors, and correspondingly a smaller fraction of agents to become bank-entrepreneurs. 
As a result, the total amount of funds available to banks will increase. Bank profits will on 
net increase, since the increase in I  offsets the decline in profits due to a higher cost of funds 
R . Therefore, banks will choose safer risky projects, corresponding to a higher p .  
 
Proposition 2 also illustrates the equilibrium relationship between bank capitalization and 
risk. As R increases, the capital ratio of the banking system declines, but this decline does not 
necessarily imply that bank risk has increased, since p goes up. Thus,  the association 
between higher aggregate capital ratios and lower bank risk typically made in partial 
equilibrium does not necessarily hold in general equilibrium.3  
 
 
B.   No Moral Hazard 
It is useful to compare the foregoing results with the outcomes of an economy where there is 
no moral hazard. To this end, here we assume that the choice of p is observable. As noted 
previously, the debt contract now pays R
p
 per unit invested, as agents take fully into account 
the observable risk they are exposed to in their specialization and investment decisions.  
 
 
At date 1,  any coalition of bank-entrepreneurs of any positive measure 0λ >  will choose 
p to maximize 
 
  
2
( )
2
ppX I k RI α λ⎛ ⎞+ − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠         (11). 
 
The interior solution is:  
 
                                                            * ( )X I kp α
+=     (12) 
 
Absent moral hazard, by (12) the choice of risk does not depend anymore directly on R : 
therefore, bank’s risk shifting does not occur.  
 
The profits per bank-entrepreneur in any coalition of positive measure are: 
 
  
*2 2 2
* ( )( ) ( )
2 2
p X I kI p X I k RI RIα α
+Π ≡ + − − = −    (13). 
                                                 
3 However, ceteris paribus, a larger availability of per-bank capital induces banks to take on less risk, as 
predicted in partial equilibrium, since p increases with k . 
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Let qˆ  denote the agent who is indifferent between being a bank-entrepreneur or a depositor. 
Then, 
ˆ( )I RqWΠ =    (14) 
 
To sum up, an equilibrium is a triplet ( , , )I p q that satisfies the following conditions: 
 
( )X I kp α
+=             (15) 
2 2( )
2
X I k RI RqWα
+ − =     (16) 
2(1 )
2
W qI −=                   (17) 
 
In this case, the existence of equilibriums with intermediation is proved in the following  
 
Proposition 3.   , In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors an equilibrium 
with intermediation exists and it is unique for every 
2 2 2 2( 2 )( , )
2 4
X k X W kR
W Wα α
+∈ .  
 
 
The comparative statics of the equilibrium triplet * * *ˆ( , , )I p q with respect to R  and k  is 
summarized in: 
 
Proposition 4.   In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors:  
              * 0RI > , *ˆ 0Rq < , * 0Rp > , * 0RK <  and * 0kp > . 
 
 
Comparing Propositions 2 and 4, it is apparent that the comparative statics with no-moral 
hazard is identical to that with moral hazard. This equivalence suggests that the negative 
relationship between bank risk-taking and the cost of funds R  is robust to the presence or the 
absence of the CVH. Of course, the levels of depositors’ supply of funds, bank capitalization, 
bank risk and real allocations will be different in the no-moral hazard and moral hazard 
economies.  
 
In the next section, we conduct a welfare comparison of the moral hazard and no-moral 
hazard economies, and define banks’ market power rents precisely.    
 
 
IV.   OPTIMALITY AND INTERMEDIARY RENTS 
Under full observability of types and actions, the set of Pareto optimal (first best) allocations 
is defined as the consumption of  the representative entrepreneur, EC , the consumption 
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allocations of investors, ( )IC q , an investment allocation decision I ,  and a threshold value of 
q  which solve: 
 
Max  
12( ) ( )
2
E I
q
V q C p C q dqα≡ − + ∫   (18) 
 
subject to the resource constraints:   
         
1
( ) ( )E I
q
qC C q dq pX I k q+ = +∫    (19) 
0 2
q WI kq W qdq+ + =∫           (20) 
 
Substituting (20) in (19), and (19) in (18),  planning problem (18)  is equivalent to the choice 
of the threshold q  and p to maximize total consumption (equal total output) net of 
entrepreneurs’ disutility of labor: 
 
 
2
2( , ) (1 )
2 2
W pV p q pX q k q qα⎛ ⎞≡ − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠    (21) 
 
 
The objective (21) is strictly concave in both q  and p . Thus, an interior solution to (21) is 
unique and characterized by the following first order conditions with respect to p and q : 
 
2(1 ) 0
2
WX q k q pqα⎛ ⎞− + − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠      (22) 
 
  
2
2(1 3 ) 0
2 2
W ppX q k α⎛ ⎞− + − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠    (23) 
 
 
Using (22) and (23) to solve for p and q , one obtains: 
 
 2 (2 )
5
O X k Wp α
+=   and   2
5
O k Wq
W
+=          (24). 
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The solution to the planning problem yields the optimal level of risk Op as well as the 
optimal degree of specialization Oq among agents.4   
 
Next, we wish to assess whether there exists any equilibrium indexed by R  that attains the 
optimum in both the moral hazard  and no-moral hazard economies. To this end, let 
* ( , )O OV V p q=  denote the value of the welfare criterion at the optimum. Note that any level 
of V  lower than the optimum will result in a Pareto-inferior allocation, since by reallocating 
productive resources (changing either q , p  or both), more output can be produced to give 
more consumption to some agents without worsening the utility of anybody else. In other 
words, in this economy a necessary condition for any consumption allocation to be Pareto 
optimal is production efficiency net of disutility of entrepreneurs’ labor.  
 
Let ˆ ˆ( ( ), ( ))p R q R  denote the unique equilibrium pair associated with a given R . Assessing 
whether an equilibrium can be optimal amounts to verifying whether there exist a value of R  
such that ˆ ˆ( ( ), ( )) ( , )O Op R q R p q= .  
 
Under the maintained assumption that intermediation occurs through debt contracts, it is 
straightforward to show that the Pareto optimal (first best) allocation cannot be achieved in 
the moral hazard economy:   
 
Proposition 5.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors, there is no 
equilibrium with intermediation that supports the Pareto optimal allocation.   
 
 
However, a second best allocation is attained by values of R  that maximizes: 
 
 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ( ), ( ))V R V p R q R≡      (25) 
 
subject to [ , ]
2
XkR X
W
∈            (26). 
 
Denote with *R  a solution to problem (25) subject to (26). The following proposition shows 
that *R  is an equilibrium in the moral hazard economy, thus supporting the second best 
allocation: 
 
                                                 
4  The rationale behind changes in the optimal values of risk and specialization to changes in parameters are 
straightforward: The optimal level of risk declines ( Op increases) in both W  and k , as well as in X , and 
increases in the (utility) cost of choosing p -projects, parameterized byα . The optimal fraction of 
entrepreneurs increases in k  and declines in W .  
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Proposition 6.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors , *R  is an 
equilibrium with intermediation that supports the second best allocation.   
 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, absent moral hazard, the first best allocation can be achieved, as 
shown in the following 
 
Proposition 7.   In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors, there exist a 
unique 0R  such that the corresponding equilibrium with intermediation supports the (first 
best) Pareto optimal allocation.   
 
In sum, we have established that there exist unique equilibriums in both the moral hazard and 
no-moral hazard economies such that  a best allocation is attained.  This identification allows 
us to define perfect competition among intermediaries and their market power rents, to which 
we now turn.   
Recall that we did not place any restriction on the capability of bank-entrepreneurs and 
depositors to bargain over debt contract terms and freely form any type of coalition at the 
initial date  Thus, if coalition formation, setting contract terms, and agents’ specialization 
choice are unfettered, then any bank coalition that offers contract terms that Pareto-improve 
the allocations of its members relative to any proposal of a competing coalition will block the 
formation of such competing coalition.  
 
Therefore, as in Boyd and Prescott (1986), we identify perfect competition among banks with 
an equilibrium in which bank coalitions offer contract terms supporting allocations in the 
core of this economy. As shown above, this outcome is characterized by bank coalitions 
offering *R  in the moral hazard economy, and 0R  in the no-moral hazard economy. 
 
A definition of banks’ market power rents follows naturally from the identification of the 
perfectly competitive outcome as one characterized by the absence of market power rents. 
Specifically, market power rents are given by the difference between the perfect competitive 
outcome—indexed by *R  in the moral hazard economy, and  0R  in the no-moral hazard 
economy— and an equilibrium value of R  strictly lower than the corresponding perfectly 
competitive outcome. We denote market power rents by ρ .5 
 
We have also shown that the objective of the planning problem in both economies is a strictly 
concave function of R . Thus all outcomes with 0ρ >  are Pareto-ranked, in the sense that if 
1 2 0ρ ρ> > , the allocations associated with 2ρ  Pareto-dominates the allocations associated 
with 1ρ .    
                                                 
5 In our context, we do not view the case *R R>  as economically relevant , since the existence of coalitions of 
depositors extracting market power rents from banks is unrealistic. 
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From the preceding analysis, our main result follows: lower market power rents result in 
lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capitalization, more efficient production plans and 
Pareto-ranked real allocations, and perfect competition supports a best allocation and optimal 
levels of risk and bank capitalization. This is summarized in the following: 
 
Proposition 8  In both the moral-hazard and no-moral hazard economies with banks and 
depositors, the equilibrium level of risk pˆ converges to the optimal level of risk *p  from 
below,  to the optimal level of bank capitalization *K from above, and to a best allocation as 
market power rents vanish, i.e. *pˆ p↑ , and  *Kˆ K↓ as 0ρ → .     
 
V.   EQUILIBRIUM WITH FIRMS, INTERMEDIARIES  AND DEPOSITORS  
So far, we have modeled an intermediary as a coalition of entrepreneurs and depositors. This 
intermediary is germane to the bank as a risk taking entity financed by depositors modeled by 
many contributions of the literature.  
 
In this section we extend our model to include firms distinct from banks. We show that in 
this extension, all results obtained previously continue to hold. Moreover, in the extended 
model intermediation may have an essential role in allowing the economy not only to reap 
the benefits of efficient specialization in production, but also those associated with 
diversification. Thus, intermediation can be viewed as essential in a strong sense: 
intermediation arrangements improve on agents’ welfare under autarky and other 
decentralized arrangements, such as credit markets, may not attain the same allocations, as in 
Boyd and Prescott (1986). 
 
A.   The Extended Model 
As before, the “entrepreneurial” technology requires to transform all agents’ endowment of 
date 0 good into an amount (0, )k W∈  of date 1 goods. Differing from the previous set-up, 
however, once an agent [0,1]q∈  has become an entrepreneur, she can either choose to 
operate a risky technology at date 1, becoming a firm, or choose to use an “intermediation” 
technology, becoming a bank. 
 
A firm has access to a set of risky projects indexed by their probability of success [0,1]p∈ . 
As before, a p-project  yields X  per unit invested  with probability  p, and 0 otherwise, with 
the choice of p being privately observed by firms. Differing from the basic set-up, however,  
we assume that the outcome of the project can be observed only at a monitoring cost by 
outsiders.  
 
Hence, the intermediation technology allows an entrepreneur—in alternative to undertake 
production directly— to become a monitoring agent by observing the outcome of one project 
and intermediate funds, that is, to become a bank. The resource cost of doing so is the entire 
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amount (0, )k W∈  of date 1 goods. For simplicity, every firm is thus paired with a bank-
entrepreneur.  
 
At date 1, banks raise funds from depositors, promising DR  per unit invested if the bank is 
solvent. At the same time, they offer funds to firms at the rate LR  per unit invested if the firm 
is solvent.  
 
On the funding side, banks and depositors will bargain over DR . On the lending side, LR  
will be determined by the choice of entrepreneurs to become either firms or banks. Note that 
depositors are assumed to observe the rate offered by banks to firms at date 1, and will 
observe the relevant payments at date 2.  Thus, depositors observe banks’ actions and their 
relevant outcomes, but not firms’ actions and outcomes directly.  
 
In this modified set-up, intermediation is essential in two key respects. First, it allows firms’ 
projects to be financed, since it makes it feasible for firms to write debt contracts with 
intermediaries, which in turn can raise finance through the same contracts from depositors. 
Second, under the assumption that project realizations are independent, intermediaries are 
instrumental in allowing the economy to reap the benefits of diversification   
 
The two polar cases of projects that are perfectly correlated and independent projects are 
described next.  
 
B.   Perfectly Correlated Projects 
We retain the assumption that project outcomes are perfectly correlated, which amounts to 
assume, as noted, that all diversification opportunities have been exploited by banks. As 
before, we denote with I  the depositors’ supply of funds to banks, which in turn lend these 
funds to firms. Since every firm is paired with a monitoring (intermediary) agent, the per-
capita amount of internal funding of entrepreneurs is / 2k , since half of entrepreneurs’ 
resources are spent in monitoring.   
 
Thus, if an entrepreneur is a firm, he chooses p to maximize 
  
2
[( ) ]
2 2
L Xk pp X R I α− + −         (27). 
 
The optimal choice of p satisfies  
                                                            *
( )
2
L XkX R I
p α
− +
=     (28),  
 
and the entrepreneur’s profits are given by   
  *
[( ) ]
2
2
L
E
XkX R I
p
− +
Π ≡         (29). 
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If the entrepreneur is a bank, its profits are: 
 
  *( )B L Dp R R IΠ ≡ −         (30). 
  
In equilibrium, the level of LR  determines entrepreneurs’ specialization choices. If LR  is 
such that E BΠ > Π , then all entrepreneurs would prefer to be firms, but they would not 
obtain any financing. Conversely, if LR  is such that E BΠ <Π , all entrepreneurs would prefer 
to be banks, but there would be no firm they could lend to. Therefore, a necessary condition 
for an equilibrium with both firms and banks to exist is that an entrepreneur is indifferent 
between being a firm or a bank. This occurs for the equilibrium value of LR  that satisfies 
E BΠ = Π , which is given by: 
 
21
3 2 3
L DX kR R
I
⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠         (31) 
 
Equation (31) shows that LR  is a positive function of DR , as a higher cost of funding for the 
bank is partially passed through raising the lending rate charged to firms. On the other hand, 
a larger I  translates into a lower lending rate, which, by Equation (28), induces firms to take 
on less risk ceteris paribus. This is the partial equilibrium CVH effect obtained by Boyd and 
De Nicolò (2005), leading risk to decline with the total amount of loans.  
 
Finally, substituting (31) in (28) and (29), one obtains expressions for risk and entrepreneurs 
profits given by: 
 
*
2 5( )
3 6
D XkX R I
p α
− +
=           (32) 
22 5[ ( ) ]
3 6( )
2
D
E
XkX R I
I α
− +
Π =        (33). 
 
When we set DR R= , (32) and (33) yield the same type of expressions of  equations (8) and 
(9), which are the equilibrium conditions determining the level of risk and the partition of 
agents between entrepreneurs and depositors for the economy with intermediaries and 
depositors only . Equation (10), the third equilibrium condition in that economy, remains 
unchanged in this extension of the model. Hence, all derivations and propositions applied to 
the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors apply to this moral hazard economy 
with firms, banks and depositors. 
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C.     Independent Projects 
Here we assume that project outcomes are independent, so that there is scope for 
intermediaries to exploit diversification opportunities. Thus, given a choice of p , for any 
positive measure of firms, p is also the fraction of successful firms, that is, firms whose 
realization of the project outcome is X . In this case, intermediation is necessary in allowing 
the economy to reap the benefits of diversification. Without banks’ monitoring of the 
outcomes of individual projects, it would not feasible to assess the true fraction of successful 
projects, and thus construct a perfectly diversified loan portfolio.  
 
Following the same line of arguments used previously, note that if an entrepreneur is a firm, 
he chooses p to maximize 
  
2
( )
2 2
Lk ppX I R I α+ − −         (34). 
The optimal choice of p satisfies  
                                                            *
( )
2
kX I
p α
+
=     (35) , 
 
and the entrepreneur’s profits are:        
2 2( )
2
2
E L
kX I
R Iα
+
Π ≡ −      (36). 
 
If an entrepreneur is a bank, then its profits are: 
 
  ( )B L DR R IΠ ≡ −         (37). 
 
An entrepreneur is indifferent between being a firm and a bank when the value of LR  
satisfies E BΠ = Π . Such value is given by: 
 
2 2( ) 12
4 2
L D
kX I
R R
Iα
+
= +         (38) 
 
Substituting (38) in (36), one obtains:  
 
2 2( )
2( )
4 2
E D
kX I II Rα
+
Π = −  (39). 
 
Similarly to the previous case, when we set DR R= , (35) and (39) yield the same type of 
expressions of  equations (15) and (16), which are the equilibrium conditions determining the 
level of risk and the partition of agents between entrepreneurs and depositors for the 
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economy with intermediaries and depositors only and no-moral hazard. Equation (17), the 
third equilibrium condition in that economy, remains unchanged in this extension of the 
model. Hence, all derivations and propositions applied to the no-moral hazard economy with 
banks and depositors apply to this moral hazard economy and independent risks with firms, 
banks and depositors.  
 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
We studied versions of a simple general equilibrium model in which agents make their 
investment and financing decisions under moral hazard and the CVH applies. We showed 
that more competition, in the form of lower banks’ market power rents, results in lower 
economy-wide risk, lower bank capitalization, more efficient production plans and Pareto-
ranked real allocations. Perfect competition, defined as the absence of market power rents, 
supports a best allocation, as well as optimal levels of risk and bank capitalization in several 
variations of our model.  
 
Thus, a general equilibrium economy which embeds investment choices subject to moral 
hazard of the type modeled by a large partial equilibrium literature, delivers implications 
entirely opposite to what these partial equilibrium constructs would predict. In essence, the 
partial equilibrium implications of the CVH do not necessarily hold in general equilibrium. If 
any inefficiency or financial instability arising from “excessive” competition indeed exists, 
then it should be identified and modeled in a general equilibrium set-up. 
 
An increasing number of studies support the empirical relevance of our theoretical results. 
Recent detailed studies on the effects of a variety of barriers of entry impeding competition, 
as well as of capture of borrowers, supports the implications of our model. For example, 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) find that branch deregulation resulted in a sharp decrease in 
loan losses. Restrictions on banks’ entry and activity have been found to be negatively 
associated with some measures of bank stability by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) and 
Beck (2006a and 2006b). Furthermore, work that links bank competition to economic growth 
is supportive of the positive role of bank competition on growth. For example, Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) find that banks with market power erect an 
important financial barrier to entry to the detriment of the entrepreneurial sector of the 
economy, leading to long-term declines in a country’s growth prospect. Lastly, Boyd, De 
Nicoló and Jalal (2006, 2009), De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2007), and Boyd, De Nicolò and 
Loukoianova (2009) find that a variety of measures of bank risk as well as bank systemic risk 
indicate a positive association between financial stability and stronger bank competition.  
 
Conclusions derived from partial equilibrium modeling that are not robust to general 
equilibrium extensions are likely to result in unwarranted welfare implications. Developing 
general equilibrium set ups in which the nexus between bank capital and risk is defined not 
only relative to individual institutions, but at a system level, appears of great relevance in 
understanding the implications of systemic risk for the design of optimal  capital regulations.  
 
A general equilibrium perspective of bank regulation has been scarcely explored 
theoretically, and has so far been absent in policy discourse. But the current financial crisis 
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provides a stark example of the dichotomy between a partial and a general equilibrium view 
of the world and its real consequences. Serious difficulties have arisen in financial 
institutions well adhering to minimum capital requirements designed—in a partial 
equilibrium perspective—to control individual banks’ risk taking incentives. General 
equilibrium modeling of intermediation appear an essential tools to throw light on the 
desirable level of systemic risk in the economy, and how it could be attained. We aim at 
contributing to this research agenda in the future.    
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APPENDIX 
Proposition 1.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors an equilibrium with 
intermediation exists and it is unique for every ( , ]
2
XkR X
W
∈ .  
Proof:   Rearranging (9) and rewriting (10), we obtain: 
 
1
2( ) RWq XkI q I
X R
−≡ = −   (A1);  and 
2
2 ( ) (1 )2
WI q I q≡ = −  (A2). 
 
An equilibrium is a value of (0,1)q∈  that satisfies (A1) and (A2).  Observe that  
2 1(0) (0)2
W XkI I
X R
= > − =− , while 2 1
2(1) 0 (1)RW XkI I
X R
−= < =−  if 2
XkR
W
≥ , which is 
necessary for 1I  to be non-negative for every value of  (0,1)q∈ , otherwise no equilibrium 
would exist.  Let 22 1
2( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )
2
W RWq XkF q I q I q q
X R
−≡ − = − − − . Clearly, ( ) 0F q′ <  holds. 
Therefore, there exists a unique value of * (0,1)q ∈  such that  *( ) 0F q = . *I  is found using 
either (A1) or (A2). Using (8), * 1 *( )p X R I Xkα− ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦  .  Q.E.D.    
 
 
Proposition 2.    In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors:  
              * 0RI > , *ˆ 0Rq < , * 0Rp > , * 0RK <  and * 0kp > . 
 
Proof:  Differentiating totally (9) and (10) with respect to I , q , R  and k , we get: 
 
2 2
X R XdI RWdq qWdR dk− − = −          (A3); 
 
0dI qWdq+ =            (A4). 
 
The determinant of the system (A3)-(A4) is 0
2
X R qW RW−Δ = + > .  
Setting 0dk = , by Cramer’s rule,  
 
21 ( ) 0R
dII qW
dR
= = >Δ          (A5),     
and  
1 0R
dqq qW
dR
≡ = − <Δ    (A6). 
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Substituting (A1) in (8), we get: 
2RWqp α=        (A7) 
Differentiating (A7) with respect to R , we get: 
2 2 2 1 0R R
dp Wq RW Wq RWp q
dR α α α
⎛ ⎞≡ = + = − >⎜ ⎟Δ⎝ ⎠      (A8), 
where the second equality was obtained using (A6), and the last inequality derives from  
RWΔ > .   
 
Finally, by (A5) and (A6) 
2 ( ) 0( )R R R
kK q I qI
I qk
= − <+       (A9) 
 
Setting 0dR =  and following the same procedure above, we obtain:  
 
    0
2k
dq Xq
dk
≡ = >Δ    (A10). 
 
Therefore,                                2 0k k
dp RWp q
dk α≡ = >   (A11) 
Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proposition 3.   In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors an equilibrium 
with intermediation exists and it is unique for every 
2 2 2 2( 2 )( , )
2 4
X k X W kR
W Wα α
+∈ .  
 
Proof:   Rearranging (16) and (17), we obtain:  
 
2 2
1
( )( )
2
X I k Iq I q
RW Wα
+≡ = −       (A9);  and 
2
2( ) 1 Iq I q
W
≡ = −      (A10). 
 
An equilibrium is a value of (0, ]
2
WI ∈  that satisfies (A1) and (A2).   
Observe that 
2 2
1(0) 2
X kq
RWα= , 1( )q I  is strictly concave in I  and strictly decreasing for all 
maxI I> , where maxI I>  is the maximum of 1( )q I . Thus, there exists a value maxIˆ I>  such 
that  1 ˆ( ) 0q I = . On the other hand, 2 (0) 1q = , 2 ( )q I  is strictly decreasing, and 2 ( ) 02
Wq = . 
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Thus, a unique intersection of 1( )q I  and 2 ( )q I —that is, a value of (0, ]2
WI ∈  that satisfies 
(A1) and (A2)—will occur for some (0, ]
2
WI ∈  only if  
2 2
2 1(0) 1 (0)2
X kq q
RWα= ≥ =  (A11), 
and 
2 2
2 1
( 2 ) 1( ) 0 ( )
2 8 2 2
W X W k Wq q
RWα
+= ≤ − =  (A12).  Inequality (A11) implies 
2 2
2
X kR
Wα≥ , 
while inequality (A12) implies 
2 2( 2 )
4
X W kR
Wα
+≤ . Thus, for every 
2 2 2 2( 2 )( , )
2 4
X k X W kR
W Wα α
+∈ , an equilibrium exists and it is unique. Using (15), 
* 1 *[ ( )]p X I kα−= +  .                                                                                                  Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
Proposition 4.   In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors:  
              * 0RI > , *ˆ 0Rq < , * 0Rp > , * 0RK <  and * 0kp > . 
 
Proof:   Differentiating totally (16) and (17) with respect to I , q , R  and k , we obtain: 
 
2 2( ) ( )( )X I k X I kR dI RWdq qW I dR dkα α
⎛ ⎞+ +− − = + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
         (A13); 
0dI qWdq+ =            (A14). 
 
The determinant of the system (A13)-(A14) is 
2 ( ) (1 ) 0X I k qW RW qα
+Δ = + − > .  
Setting 0dk = , by Cramer’s rule,  
 
1 ( ) 0R
dII qW I qW
dR
= = + >Δ          (A15),    and  
 
1 ( ) 0R
dqq qW I
dR
≡ = − + <Δ    (A16). 
 
Differentiating (15) with respect to R , we get: 
 
0R R
dp XIp I
dR α≡ = >      (A18), 
 
where we have used (A15).  
 
 
Finally, by (A15) and (A16) 
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2 ( ) 0( )R R R
kK q I qI
I qk
= − <+       (A9) 
 
Setting 0dR = , and following the same procedure above, we obtain:  
 
21 ( ) 0k
dI X I kI qW
dk α
+= = − <Δ    (A20),    
 
 Hence,  
2 1
2 1
( )( 1) (1 ) 0
( ) (1 )R k
dp X X qWX I kp I
dR qWX I k RW q
α
α α α
−
−
+≡ = + = − >+ + − , (A21), 
 
where we have used (A20) and Δ .                                                                             Q.E.D.  
 
 
 
Proposition 5.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors, there is no 
equilibrium with intermediation that supports the Pareto optimal allocation.   
 
Proof:  Inserting (10) in (8), replacing ( , )p q  with ( , )O Op q  in  (8) and (9), and solving for 
R  in (8) and (9) respectively, we obtain 
 
1 2
2 2
(1 )
O
O
Xk pR R X
W q
α−≡ = + −         (A22) 
2
2 2
(1 ) 2
(1 ) 4
O
O O
XW q XkR R
W q q W
− +≡ = − +      (A23) 
 
Using (24) in (A22) and (A23) yields  1 2
40
24 2 20
5
XWR R
k WW k W
W
= ≠ =+− +
.  
 
Thus, there does not exist a value of which yields an equilibrium with ( , ) ( , )O Op q p q= . 
Hence, there is no equilibrium that supports the Pareto optimal allocation.             Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proposition 6.   In the moral hazard economy with banks and depositors, *R  is an 
equilibrium with intermediation that supports the second best allocation.   
 
Proof:  A solution *R to problem (25) subject to (26) exists, since the continuous function 
(.)V in (25) is maximized over the compact set (26). Since function (.)V  is strictly concave 
in ( , )p q , there exist a unique pair * *ˆ ˆ( , )p q  that solves (25) subject to (26). Since ˆ ( )p R  and 
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ˆ( )q R  are uniquely determined by the equilibrium conditions (8)-(10), there exists a unique 
*R  such that * *ˆ ˆ ( )p p R= and * *ˆ ˆ( )q q R= .                                                                 Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proposition 7.   In the no-moral hazard economy with banks and depositors, there exist a 
unique 0R  such that the corresponding equilibrium with intermediation supports the (first 
best) Pareto optimal allocation.  
 
Proof:  Using  (17) and ( , )O Op q  in (15) and (16), we obtain: 
 ( )22 (1 ) 2O Op X W q kα = − +    (A24) 
2
2 2 2(1 ) (1 ) 2
2
O O OWX q k RW q Rq Wα α⎛ ⎞− + − − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠    (A25) 
 
Equation (A24) is independent of R . Solving (A25) for R , we obtain: 
 
( )22 2*
2
2 (1 )
4 (1 2 )
O
O O
k W q X
R
W q qα
+ −= + − .   (A26) 
 
Lastly, we need to verify that *R  is an equilibrium. By proposition 3, this amounts to verify 
that
2 2 2 2
* ( 2 )( , )
2 4
X k X W kR
W Wα α
+∈ . Thus, *R is an equilibrium if  
 
 
( )22 22 2
2
2 (1 )
2 4 (1 2 )
O
O O
k W q XX k
W W q qα α
+ −< + − (A27) 
 
and 
 
( )22 2 2 2
2
2 (1 ) ( 2 )
4 (1 2 ) 4
O
O O
k W q X X W k
W q q Wα α
+ − +<+ − (A28). 
 
Rearranging (A27), we obtain 
  
2 2 2 2 2 2 24 (1 ) 4 (1 ) 2 (1 2 )O O O Ok W q kW q k q q+ − + − > + − (A29). 
 
By assumption, 1k < , 1W > and 0 1q≤ ≤ . Therefore, 
2 2 22 (1 2 ) 4O Ok q q k+ − ≤ and 2 2 2 2(1 ) 4 (1 ) 0O OW q kW q− + − > . Thus, inequality (A29) holds, 
hence, inequality (A27) is verified. 
 
 (A28) is equivalent to  
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2 22 (1 ) (2 ) 1 2O O Ok W q k W q q+ − < + + − (A30) 
 
Since 21 1 2 2O Oq q≤ + − ≤  and 21 1Oq− ≤ , (A30) holds, thus (A28) is verified.        Q.E.D.  
 
 
Proposition 8 In both the moral-hazard and no-moral hazard economies with banks and 
depositors, the equilibrium level of risk pˆ converges to the optimal level of risk *p  from 
below,  to the optimal level of bank capitalization *K from above, and to a best allocation as 
market power rents vanish, i.e. *pˆ p↑ , and  *Kˆ K↓ as 0ρ → .   
Proof:  By propositions 2 and 4, pˆ  increases monotonically in R . By propositions 6 and 7, 
there exists a unique optimal *R  that supports the optimal level of risk *p . Therefore 
* *ˆ ˆ( ) ( )p R p R p↑ =  and * *ˆ ˆ( ) ( )K R K R K↓ = as * 0R Rρ = − → .                                   Q.E.D. 
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